At the center of political clashes in Brazil, the USA and the European Union, big techs are expected to enter the 2024 municipal elections in a scenario of greater pressure.
While the US is putting pressure on TikTok and the Europeans have acted to regulate the platforms in a broad way, in Brazil it is the Electoral Court that tightens the siege on companies, even being the target of criticism for moving forward in relation to what is established in the Marco Civil da Internet.
On the part of companies, which have been reactive to Congressional regulation, there is no evidence that they should act more effectively to combat disinformation in elections. At the same time, they promote internal changes that can have a negative impact on this task.
Just like the appropriation of the speech against censorship by the right, the movement of big techs reflects a global scenario of greater public scrutiny, in the year in which half of the world’s population goes through elections.
Holding national elections in countries like the USA and India raises expectations for companies, says Bruna Martins dos Santos, global campaigns manager at the Digital Action organization.
“We are at an inflection point, in which part of society has started to see platforms as co-responsible for democratic erosion in much of the world,” she says, who is also part of the Coalition Rights on the Network.
After legislative regulation, as occurred in the European Union, and measures by the Electoral Court, she points out that the question is whether companies will comply with these rules.
Another change of pieces on the board is the departure of STF (Supreme Federal Court) minister Alexandre de Moraes from the presidency of the TSE (Superior Electoral Court).
The main change approved by the court this year says that companies can be held jointly and severally liable if they do not remove content and accounts immediately in the case of illegal anti-democratic conduct, untrue or seriously decontextualized facts that “affect the integrity of the electoral process”, hate speech , among other items.
Until now, unless in the case of a court order, the platforms’ moderation action on electoral content was anchored in their own rules. A scenario that also leads to criticism not only regarding gaps in global network policies, but also regarding whether their application would be consistent.
In 2022, ten days before the second round, the TSE approved a new rule, expanding the court’s power to determine the removal of content even without provocation from the parties or the Public Ministry — whose actions were marked by inaction, even in the face of widespread disinformation campaigns against the polls.
Following the spread of coup camps, the rule was used to suspend profiles and chat groups.
In 2024, at the same time as there is a greater possibility of sanctions, scrutiny regarding the networks’ moderation action should also occur with fewer monitoring tools available to researchers, entities and the press.
OX (formerly Twitter), for example, stopped offering free access to its API and Meta, owner of Facebook and Instagram, announced the end of Crowdtangle. Both tools allowed external monitoring of network data. TikTok no longer offered this type of feature.
Communication professor at Universidade Federal Fluminense Viktor Chagas criticizes this movement of platforms, which he also sees as a reaction to actions and attempts at regulation. “They somehow found themselves vulnerable in their condition and so they decided to become even more opaque than they already were,” he says.
In the Brazilian context for 2024, he states that, on the one hand, the fact that the elections are municipal partially takes away the weight of campaign networks, since in small cities hand-to-hand tends to be more important. On the other hand, he sees the use of platforms this year by leaders already aiming for 2026.
“We are going through a period of still a lot of uncertainty about what will happen in the second half of the year”, he says.
This year will also be the first election in Brazil after the launch of communities on WhatsApp, a feature that began postponed until after the 2022 electoral dispute, which was recommended at the time by the Public Prosecutor’s Office in São Paulo.
Another new TSE rule is the obligation to have libraries of advertisements and boosted posts of an electoral political nature, with a broad definition of what should be made available.
Last week, Google announced that it would stop allowing political ads. One of the reasons would be the high cost and complexity of moderation based on the court’s determination. OX, in turn, which previously prohibited political promotion, began to allow it after being acquired by businessman Elon Musk.
Another factor highlighted by experts as fundamental to combating disinformation is investment in moderation and security teams, especially with knowledge of the language and local contexts.
Since the last election, however, several companies have made significant cuts to their teams, affecting different areas.
For several reasons, X has the greatest degree of uncertainty, say experts in the field.
At the beginning of the month, Musk began a series of attacks on Alexandre de Moraes, whom he called a censor and dictator due to orders to block profiles on the network. The billionaire also promised to disobey the courts and reopen the accounts.
Despite this threat not being carried out, the minister’s orders sent to X were published by a committee in the US Congress. Together with Musk’s rhetoric, this has influenced the political debate by fueling the Bolsonarism narrative that there is censorship of its spokespeople.
On the contrary, experts believe that the decision by the American Congress that could lead to the banning of TikTok could have an indirect impact on the debate in Brazil by legitimizing the speech in favor of blockades.
Although some problems are general, Yasmin Curzi, professor at FGV Direito Rio, understands that not all companies should be placed “in the same framework”, adding that, in Musk’s case, political-ideological interests are involved and not simply commercial ones.
Not optimistic about how much progress has been made in combating disinformation so far, she points out that by looking more at removing content, there is a risk of generating more attention and support for groups that claim to be censored.
“We are not looking at this wheel that is turning this engagement”, he says, defending more transparency about the networks’ recommendation algorithms.
